



The Foreign Savings Glut: 
Inordinate Savers or Thriving Traders?
Owen F. Humpage
In the years prior to our recent economic crisis, foreign savings poured into the United States. Did foreign traders who 
happened to acquire dollars from American trade deﬁ  cits merely choose to keep these funds in dollar-denominated 
assets? Or, did foreigners decide to increase their savings inordinately and place those funds in dollar-denominated as-
sets? The answer is key to the debate about the sources of liquidity that paved the way to our recent economic problems. 
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A lively debate has arisen over the contribution that foreign 
savings may have made to our current economic problems. 
Some economists argue that a glut of foreign savings ﬂ  owed 
into the United States and helped to inﬂ  ate the U.S. hous-
ing bubble, whose bursting caused the ﬁ  nancial turmoil that 
led to our recent recession. To be sure, in the decade before 
the U.S. housing bust in 2006, foreign savings poured into 
the United States. The savings-glut hypothesis, however, im-
plies that the foreigners providing the inﬂ  ux of funds were 
“inordinate savers,” who placed their wealth in U.S. assets, 
as opposed to “thriving traders,” who acquired and held on 
to a substantial quantity of dollar-denominated assets. The 
distinction is subtle, but key to the debate. 
Each of these behaviors leaves a distinct footprint on our 
exchange rates and balance of payments, so these data 
might help to tell the tale. When inordinate foreign savings 
is driving events, a dollar appreciation will accompany an 
expanding current-account deﬁ  cit. When thriving foreign 
traders hold sway, a dollar depreciation will go hand-in-hand 
with a growing current-account deﬁ  cit. 
Both patterns have appeared in our accounts over the 
years, but the data leading up to the bursting of the hous-
ing bubble does not seem consistent with the savings-glut 
hypothesis. From early 2002 through late 2005, the dol-
lar depreciated broadly as the U.S. current-account deﬁ  cit 
grew, suggesting that thriving foreign traders, not inordinate 
foreign savers, determined events. 
Current-Account Basics
A one-to-one correspondence exists between a nation’s 
current-account balance and the ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows that cross its 
borders. In 2008, when the United States ran a $706 billion 
current-account deﬁ  cit, it also experienced a $706 billion net 
inﬂ  ow of foreign funds, ignoring measurement error. That 
same year, China maintained a $426 billion current-account 
surplus and experienced a net ﬁ  nancial outﬂ  ow of equivalent 
size. This fundamental correspondence comes about wheth-
er driven by domestic-consumption choices—and trade—or 
by foreign-savings decisions. 
The United States has run a current-account deﬁ  cit almost 
continuously since 1982. When our imports exceed our ex-
ports, we pay for the surfeit of imports by offering the rest of 
the world ﬁ  nancial claims against our future output. These 
ﬁ  nancial claims consist of such things as stocks, bonds, Trea-
sury securities, and bank accounts. Private individuals and 
businesses across the globe hold most of these claims, but 
foreign governments, their central banks, and international 
organizations take up a good portion. The issuance of these 
ﬁ  nancial claims creates a net ﬂ  ow of foreign savings into 
the United States, which, in the absence of measurement 
error, must exactly equal our current-account deﬁ  cit. Should 
the ﬂ  ow of foreign savings ever start to diverge from the 
accumulating current-account deﬁ  cit, exchange rates—and 
possibly other economic variables—will adjust to maintain 
the accounting identity between the two. 
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account surplus almost consistently since 1990. Prior to 
2004, that surplus was fairly small, but since then it has ex-
panded sharply. When Chinese traders export more goods 
and services than they import, they receive foreign currency 
in payment for the balance. China then invests these earn-
ings in foreign-currency-denominated assets, thereby chan-
neling the funds back into the ﬁ  nancial markets of the coun-
tries whose assets it holds. Dollar assets, for example, guide 
Chinese savings into the United States; euro assets direct 
Chinese savings into Europe; yen assets channel Chinese 
savings into Japan. Because the Chinese government limits 
the ability of private individuals and businesses to invest 
funds abroad and instead requires them to exchange foreign 
currencies for renminbi with its central bank, much of this 
recycling occurs through ofﬁ  cial channels. Foreign ﬁ  nancial 
claims become ofﬁ  cial reserve assets. That does not matter 
for our story; the funds still represent Chinese savings that 
return to foreign ﬁ  nancial markets. Economists estimate that 
China holds somewhere between 60 percent and 70 percent 
of its ofﬁ  cial reserves in dollar-denominated assets, implying 
that most of these savings head back into the United States. 
So far, I have discussed the fundamental correspondence 
between current-account deﬁ  cits or surpluses and net 
ﬁ  nancial inﬂ  ows or outﬂ  ows as if the ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows always 
responded to the developments in the current account, but 
this need not be the case. For myriad reasons, foreigners 
often elect—independent of trade—to increase their sav-
ings and to channel those funds into U.S. ﬁ  nancial instru-
ments. U.S. ﬁ  nancial instruments are liquid and relatively 
risk free, and the dollar is the key international currency. 
With roughly 88 percent of all foreign-exchange transac-
tions across the globe involving dollars, having a portfolio 
of dollars is useful. When foreigners channel their savings 
into dollars, the inﬂ  ow of foreign funds produces a current-
account deﬁ  cit in the United States, through a mechanism 
that I will explain below. 
While the correspondence between the current-account 
deﬁ  cit and the inﬂ  ow of foreign savings is always one-to-
one, whether initiated by a U.S. desire to import goods from 
the rest of the world (resulting in those thriving foreign 
traders) or by a foreign desire to place savings in dollar-
denominated ﬁ  nancial assets (initiated by those inordinate 
foreign savers), the exchange-rate response is fundamentally 
different in each case. When expanding U.S. imports drive 
the process, the dollar will depreciate in foreign-exchange 
markets, but when an inﬂ  ow of foreign savings triggers the 
process, the dollar will appreciate. Working backwards—ob-
serving how the dollar behaved when the current-account 
deﬁ  cit expanded—provides a clue about whether a domestic 
consumption choice or a foreign savings decision kicked off 
the subsequent sequence of events. It allows us to determine 
whether an inﬂ  ow of foreign savings stemmed from inordi-
nate foreign savers or thriving foreign traders. 
Savings Glut
To be sure, there is ample evidence for the saving-glut 
hypothesis. In the decade before the housing crisis, for-
eign savings increased signiﬁ  cantly. This growth in sav-
ings manifested itself in a substantial expansion of foreign 
current-account surpluses across the globe. While the 
phenomenon was widespread, developing and emerging-
market economies—particularly those in Asia—accounted 
for the lion’s share. 
In large part, precautionary motives drove their desire for 
more savings. Following a series of global ﬁ  nancial crises in 
the late 1990s, emerging and developing countries, notably 
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand, 
began to build ofﬁ  cial foreign-exchange reserve buffers 
against the prospects of future ﬁ  nancial chaos. They did this 
in large measure by promoting domestic growth through 
exports, often keeping exchange rates artiﬁ  cially low, but by 
whatever means it occurred, higher savings were associated 
with expanding current-account surpluses in their coun-
tries. Between 2001 and 2005, according to IMF data, the 
surplus among emerging market and developing economies 
increased ninefold. 
While developing and emerging-market economies led the 
way, the large developed countries, notably Japan and Ger-
many, followed step. Between 2001 and 2005, their current-
account surpluses also grew. Many of these countries have 
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Figure 1. Current-Account Deﬁ  cits and the Dollar
Note: Percent of GDP is calculated as a seasonally adjusted annual rate. 
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Federal Reserve Board.
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markets, which helped to keep interest rates lower, and 
investment spending higher, than otherwise would have 
been the case. Indeed, nominal and real long-term interest 
rates—whether because of foreign savings, monetary ease, 
or both—were lower between 2001 and 2005 than they had 
been since the early 1960s. Financial innovations helped 
channel these funds into the housing market, where abun-
dant ﬁ  nancing at low interest rates encouraged leveraging 
and risk taking. 
The saving-glut hypothesis, as noted, implies that the 
foreigners providing the inﬂ  ux of funds were savers who 
placed their wealth into U.S. assets as opposed to traders, 
who acquired and held a substantial quantity of dollar-
denominated assets. 
Telltale Footprints 
While both the inordinate-foreign-savers story and the 
thriving-foreign-traders scenario produce an expanding 
current-account deﬁ  cit, they have opposite impacts on the 
dollar. If inordinate foreign savers want to place their funds 
in dollar-denominated assets, they must ﬁ  rst purchase 
dollars in the foreign-exchange market. Their purchases 
will drive the dollar’s exchange value higher. As the dol-
lar appreciates, the foreign-currency prices of U.S. exports 
rise and the dollar prices of U.S. imports fall. These price 
changes shift worldwide demand away from U.S. goods, 
causing the U.S. current-account deﬁ  cit to expand and 
maintaining the one-to-one correspondence between foreign 
ﬁ  nancial inﬂ  ows and our current-account deﬁ  cit. 
In contrast, when U.S. residents decide to buy more foreign-
made goods and services, thereby allowing foreign traders 
to thrive, they ﬁ  rst must sell dollars and buy foreign cur-
rencies. These transactions cause the dollar to depreciate 
in exchange markets. The dollar’s depreciation improves 
the foreign-currency return on U.S. ﬁ  nancial instruments, 
enticing those foreigners who acquire dollars through trade 
to hold them in U.S. ﬁ  nancial assets. The dollar’s deprecia-
tion also insures that the inﬂ  ow of foreign savings exactly 
matches an expanding current-account deﬁ  cit. 
Both patterns have appeared over the past few decades. 
Foreign savings shot into the United States from mid-1997 
through 2000, during the dot-com boom. As they acquired 
dollar-denominated assets, foreign savers forced a 16 percent 
real—or inﬂ  ation-adjusted—appreciation of the dollar against 
a broad array of our key trading partners. The real appre-
ciation shifted worldwide demand away from U.S. traded 
goods and increased the current-account deﬁ  cit by a full 
2 percentage points of GDP (see ﬁ  gure 1). 
In contrast, the conﬁ  guration of dollar and current-account 
movements that developed after the 2001 recession and 
before the 2006 real estate bust points to domestic-demand 
growth—not inordinate foreign savings—as a key causal 
development. From late 2001 through the end of 2005, the 
dollar depreciated 13 percent. Over this same time period, 
the U.S. current-account deﬁ  cit again rose by 2 percentage 
points of GDP. 
To be sure, more foreign savings ﬂ  owed into the United 
States between late 2001 and late 2005 than between 
1997 and 2000, but a tsunami of foreign savings did not 
come washing up on our shores. Between 2001 and 2005, 
developments in this country seemed to attract the foreign 
savings in. Expanding domestic demand increased imports 
and led to a dollar depreciation, which made U.S. ﬁ  nancial 
assets attractive to those thriving foreign traders who were 
earning dollars. 
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